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Abstract 
This article analyzes the probable effects of recent deregulation of consumer credit markets and tax reform on 
household credit-use decisions. The results of the analysis suggest that deregulation of rates of charge for consumer 
credit contracts accounts for a substantial portion of the increase in consumer credit outstanding relative to 
household income since 1982. The effect would not originate from the extention of credit in newly deregulated 
markets to households that had not been able to get credit before (widening of credit use). Rather, it would come 
from the provision of greater amounts of credit to borrowers in general (deepening of credit use). With regard to 
tax reform, the probability of debt use is significantly higher for those households most likely to itemize deductions 
for federal income tax purposes. Holding the level of interest rates constant, tax reform that removes the 
deductibility of consumer interest is not expected to affect the amount of credit used relative to income but is 
expected to have a significant effect on the type of debt used by such households. They will likely be early adopters 
of home equity lines of credit. Their shift from consumer to mortgage credit is expected to have a long-term negative 
effect on the credit quality of consumer credit portfolios. 
The market for consumer credit in the United States has historically been highly regulated 
in terms of allowed prices for contracts and licensed providers----conditions that limited 
potential competition and credit availability. At the same time, the use of consumer credit 
was encouraged by federal income tax policy that allowed the deduction of interest paid for 
consumer credit in the calculation of taxable income for those households that itemized 
deductions. 
Interest rate ceilings and the tax treatment of consumer interest represent public policies 
that potentially influence the availability and cost of credit and, therefore, consumers' 
incentive to use credit for consumption purposes. In the last decade, many of the legal 
restrictions on the maximum allowable rate of interest charged for consumer credit contracts 
were either totally eliminated or raised to such a level that they were not binding. This 
deregulation-widespread by the end of 1982-was initiated by the combined forces of the 
deregulation of deposit markets and the high inflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
More recently, the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 initiated a schedule for phasing out the 
deductibility of consumer interest in the calculation of federal income taxes. By 1991, none 
of the interest paid in association with traditional forms of consumer credit (e.g., auto 
loans,credit cards, etc.) will be deductible. 
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It is likely that the effects of these changes in public policies supporting or discouraging 
borrowing will not be immediately evident. As was pointed out by Christelow 
( 1988), '"When a new policy supportive of borrowing is introduced, households in their early 
high-borrowing years are likely to borrow substantially more relative to income than their 
predecessors. The upward adjustment will continue for a number of years as new adults 
borrow at similarly high rates." The goal of this analysis is to assess the impact of these 
recent changes in public policies on future consumer credit use decisions-both whether 
and how much credit is used. In the first section of this article, the components of a reduced 
form model of consumer credit use are identified. In the second section, the model is 
estimated, using survey data collected from a national sample of households. The 
conclusions and implications are presented in the third and final section. 
1. The credit use decision 
The utility-maximizing household decides whether to use consumer credit and how much 
credit to use. The ultimate outcome of those decisions is hypothesized to be a function of 
lenders' willingness to provide credit at a price that does not exceed the borrower's marginal 
utility of consumption. 
1.1. Credit use without policy effects 
1.1.1. Credit supply. Profit-maximizing lenders will extend the amount of credit 
demanded given that they may charge a rate sufficient to cover their direct costs of lending 
plus a risk-adjusted return to capital. As presented in Barth and associates (1983), the interest 
rate charged on a contract by a supplier of personal loans increases with the uncertainty of 
the contract repayment stream and with the transactions costs associated with administering 
and collecting payments. In the personal loan market, information pertaining to the level 
and stability of household income and real property holdings (homeownership) are 
frequently used as indicators of the credit quality of an applicant. Thus, the offered price 
of credit would be higher for those credit applicants who have low income, are renters, work 
in industries with highly uncertain earnings, or who represent households with less 
diversified cash inflows. 
1.1.2. Credit demand. Household demand for consumer credit is derived from current 
consumption decisions. A household will use credit to finance current consumption when 
the marginal utility of consumption exceeds the marginal cost of credit and in tum, the 
marginal cost of credit is lower than the opportunity cost associated with liquidation of 
available financial assets. The cost of credit includes the after-tax cost of interest paid, the 
transactions cost associated with credit search and debt repayment, and the psychological 
costs, such as fear of default and financial failure, associated with credit use. Holding 
demand for consumption constant, we expect the probability of credit use and the amount 
of credit used to increase as the marginal cost of credit decreases, but to decline as liquid 
asset holdings increase. The psychological costs of credit use would likely be reflected in 
attitudes toward the use of credit. We hypothesize that households that do not believe that 
credit use is a good idea will be less likely to use credit relative to those who have more 
positive views concerning the use of credit. 
Household demand for current consumption is a function of household life cycle. Thus, 
basic demand for consumer credit is expected to be not only a function of price but also 
of life cycle. The results of previous analyses of credit use provide support for the life cycle 
theory of credit use. Enthoven (1957) was the first of many to find that young married 
householders with children were more likely to have consumer debt than those without 
children or than households composed of a single person. As the household head aged, and 
children left home, the probability of consumer credit use declined. 
Given these conditions for supply and demand in the personal loan market, we 
empirically test the effects of rate restrictions and tax policy changes on credit use decisions. 
This is accomplished through an analysis of household credit use data, holding constant 
demographic and portfolio characteristics that differentiate households in terms of their 
creditworthiness or their demand for consumer credit. 
1.2. The role of public policies 
Interest rate regulation and tax policy influence the price that may be charged for credit and 
the after-tax cost of credit; therefore, they are expected to be instrumental in the household 
credit use decision. In this section we describe the theory and evidence regarding these 
influences. 
1.2.1. Rate regulations. Regulations that restrict the rate charged for consumer credit 
forces lenders to construct credit contracts in such a way as to limit the risk taken to the 
level that can be compensated for-given the rate ceiling. Theory suggests that when 
constrained by a rate ceiling, lenders would make portfolio adjustments and divert funds 
to investments where expected rates of return were commensurate with the risk incurred. 
In the absence of significant transactions costs associated with assessing individual credit 
worthiness, lenders would ration credit to high-risk borrowers. Thus, interest rate ceilings 
would be expected to have the effect of reducing the availability of consumer credit in 
general or to high-risk borrowers in particular. 
Several researchers have studied the effects of rate regulation by analyzing the high-risk 
segment of the cash credit market or local markets with extremely restrictive rate ceilings. 
Barth and associates (1983) presented evidence that between January 1975 and August 1977 
the average dollar value of personal loans from consumer finance companies (high-risk 
specialists in personal loan markets) was significantly lower in situations where interest rate 
ceilings restricted the rate of charge for such contracts, holding other things constant. 
Peterson (1979) found that the minimum size of personal loan offered by commercial banks 
in 1978 (low-risk specialists in personal loan markets) was significantly higher in a state 
with a severely restrictive rate ceiling (Arkansas) relative to those in states without such 
limits. 
The results from the analyses of lenders' adjustments suggest that the probability and the 
amount of consumer credit used would be systematically influenced by restrictive rate 
ceilings. In cross-sectional analyses, one would expect to find that high-risk borrowers had 
less credit but that low-risk borrowers might have at least as much credit as their risk 
equivalent counterparts in less restricted markets. On average, the amount of credit used 
would be lower in the restricted markets. Dunkelberg and DeMagistris (1979) analyzed 
household portfolio data and concluded that consumer installment credit (excluding 
revolving credit) was rationed in Arkansas and Wisconsin-states with restrictive rate 
ceilings. Holding credit worthiness constant, borrowers in those states had significantly less 
consumer installment credit when compared to borrowers in other states without such 
restrictions. 
But, Peterson ( 1983) found that borrowers in Arkansas had as much total consumer credit 
as their counterparts in less restrictive states. Borrowers in Arkansas had substituted retail 
or point-of-sale credit when they had been unable to obtain cash credit. Peterson (1979) 
presented evidence that the restrictive rate ceiling in Arkansas caused creditors to prefer 
indirectly obtained credit to direct credit (credit contracts purchased from retailers as 
opposed to contracts originated by the financial institution). Since retailers could adjust the 
price of merchandise to cover the cost of providing credit, they were able to provide 
point-of-sale credit to households when cash lenders could not profitably serve their credit 
needs directly. Peterson stated that previous investigations had yielded misleading evidence 
on the effects of usury ceilings because they had considered only a portion of consumers' 
total debt portfolios. Further, he concluded that "while usury ceilings may have a major 
impact on the structure of credit markets, they are not likely to have a substantial effect on 
the total amount of credit used by consumers." 
It is unlikely that the evidence from Arkansas is representative of the effects of usury 
ceilings in states where interest rate ceilings become restrictive only periodically. The 10 
percent rate ceiling in Arkansas analyzed in the Peterson study applied to all types of 
consumer credit and had been in effect since 1934. In most time periods since interest rates 
for consumer loans have been recorded, the rate ceiling in Arkansas was restrictive, even 
for secured new auto loans. 1 The entire structure of the consumer credit market had adjusted 
to the rate ceiling-for example, there were no consumer finance companies in Arkansas 
in 1978 when the data analyzed by Peterson were collected. There were many pawn shops, 
and lease-to-own arrangements were a popular means of acquiring consumer durables. By 
analyzing markets with less severe and less broad-based restrictions, we are able to provide 
further evidence of the process by which lenders adjust and the impact of those adjustments 
on household credit-use decisions. 
1.2.2. Tax policy. Another public policy acting on the consumer credit use decision is 
that dictating the tax treatment of interest. Since the introduction of the income tax in 1916, 
nearly all interest expense has been deductible. The tax deductibility of interest became an 
incentive to household borrowing when the Revenue Act of 1942 brought low and middle 
income households into the tax base. However, the tax incentive associated with the use of 
consumer credit was available only to those borrowers who itemized deductions. 2 TRA 
contained a provision for phasing out the deductibility of interest paid for consumer credit 
while leaving intact, with some limitations, the deductibility of interest paid on mortgage 
credit. 
There is little empirical evidence to indicate the importance of the tax deductibility of 
interest in consumers' credit use decision. Lansing, Maynes, and Kreinin (1957) found that 
homeowners with a mortgage (not all homeowners) were significantly more likely to use 
consumer credit than homeowners without a mortgage or those not owning a home. Their 
finding may be evidence of a tax-related incentive to use consumer credit. Homeowners with 
a mortgage are the most likely group of taxpayers to itemize deductions and benefit from 
the deductibility of consumer interst. Avery and associates (1987) provide evidence to 
suggest that a portion of the growth in credit outstanding between 1983 and 1986 is due 
to the increased probability of credit use among upper-income households. Perhaps this 
phenomenon is associated with "bracket-creep" that reduced the after-tax cost of consumer 
credit for those households. 
2. The effects of public policies on credit use 
We hypothesize that household demand for consumer credit reflects the position of the 
household in the life cycle and the after-tax cost of credit relative to the utility of current 
consumption. Further, lenders' ability and willingness to serve the credit needs of the 
household are expected to be a function of the risk characteristics of the household and 
market conditions limiting their ability to take credit risk. To test the effects of rate 
deregulation and tax reform on consumer credit use, we estimated a reduced form model 
of the probability of household credit use and the amount of credit used relative to income. 
The specific demographic and economic variables included in the model were those 
discussed in the previous section of the article and are described in table 1. Squared terms 
for household income and liquid assets were included in the regression equations to allow 
for possible nonlinear effects of these variables. 
Additional variables were included to capture the effects of regional variation in 
consumer credit rates, a phenomenon that has been documented in earlier studies. All but 
two of the variables listed in table 1 were included as regressors in both the analyses of the 
probability of credit use and the amount of credit used. The exceptions were variables that 
capture debtors' actual experience in credit markets (whether they had been turned down) 
and their debt management skills (whether they had ever missed a payment or been late on 
a payment), which were only included in the analysis of the amount of debt outstanding 
relative to income. Given that the household reported difficulty obtaining the amount of 
credit desired, it was expected that the "prior rejection'' variable would be negatively 
associated with the debt-to-income ratio. Having trouble making debt payments was 
expected to be associated with higher debt-to-income ratios. 
Variables included in the model to capture the effects of the legal restrictions on interest 
rates and the tax incentive associated with the use of credit were both 0-1 dummy variables. 
The legal restriction variable was equal to 1 for those states that restricted the interest rate 
charged for cash credit by financial institutions to 18 percent or less in 1982 and 0 otherwise. 
The data set did not contain information revealing whether the household itemized 
Table I. Definitions of variables in analyses. 
Life cycle stage of household head 
Young single 1 = <45, single, no children 
Single parent 1 = any age, single, children 
Older/working 1 = >45, in labor force and married with or without children or single, 
Older/retired 
Family formation 
Home ownership 
Income-related measures 
Income 
Income squared 
Stable income 
Two-income 
Tax incentive 
no children 
1 = >45, retired, disabled, not in labor force, and married with or without 
children or single, no children 
0 = <45, married, with or without children 
1 = owns or is buying a home; 0 otherwise 
xx.xxx = 1982 before-tax household income ($1,000s) 
income squared ($1,000,000s) 
1 = at least 1 wage earner is employed in a stable industry, including 
manufacturing, transportation, communication, utilities, sanitary 
and professional services, wholesale trade, financial, real estate, 
insurance, and public administration (industry classifications from 
U.S. Population Census) 
0 = all wage earners unemployed or employed in less stable industries, 
including agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, construction, retail 
trade, business and repair services, personal services and entertain-
ment, and recreational services 
1 = second wage-earner in household; 0 otherwise 
1 = have mortgage and were in >25 percent tax bracket in 1982 
0 = all others 
Liquid assets xx.xxx = checking, savings, money market accounts, U.S. Savings Bonds, 
other federal securities held by household ($1,000s) 
Liquid assets squared value of liquid assets squared ($1,000,QOOs) 
Geographic market conditions 
Rate ceiling 1 = state had ceiling on interest rates of 18 percent or less for consumer 
Region of residence 
West 
South 
Attitude toward credit 
Good idea 
Bad idea 
Prior rejection 
Late pay 
credit from financial institutions. These states are: AR. CT, FL, IA 
KY, LA, MA, ME, MI, MN, MO, NC, PA, TX, WA. WV(4otherstates 
with low rate ceilings were not included in the sample data) 
1 = resides in the West; 0 otherwise 
1 = resides in the South; 0 otherwise 
1 = considers purchase on installment plan good; 0 otherwise 
1 = considers purchase on installment plan bad; 0 othewise 
1 = turned down for amount requested on loan in previous years; 0 
otherwise 
1 = unable to make all loan payments during the last year according to 
schedule; 0 otherwise 
deductions for tax purposes nor did it provide reliable information on the marginal tax rate. 
To test the effect of the tax incentive on the use of consumer credit, we assumed that 
homeowners with a mortgage who were in at least the 25 percent marginal tax bracket (based 
on the 1983 Tax Rate Schedule) would have adequate incentive to adjust their household 
balance sheet to take advantage of the tax deductibility of consumer interest. The tax effect 
variable was equal to 1 for those households and 0 otherwise. In the analyses of whether 
and how much consumer credit was used by a household, the coefficient of the legal 
restriction variable was expected to be negative and that for the tax effect variable was 
expected to be positive. 
2.1. The data 
The data analyzed were derived from a national sample of 3,824 households surveyed 
during the first half of 1983. The composition of each household's portfolio of assets and 
liabilities was measured as were sociodemographic characteristics of the household, 
information on attitudes, experience with creditors, and state of residence. See Avery and 
associates (1984a, 1984b) for a complete description of the data set. Table 2 presents the 
mean values of all variables used in the analysis. 
Table 2. Mean values of variables in analyses. 
Independent Variable 
Life cycle stage of household head 
Young single 
Single parent 
Older/working 
Older/retired 
Home ownership 
Income-related measures 
Income (000) 
Income squared (000.000) 
Stable income 
Two-income 
Tax incentive 
Liquid assets (000) 
Liquid assets squared (000,000) 
Geographic market conditions 
Rate ceiling 
Region of residence 
West 
South 
Attitude toward credit 
Good idea 
Bad idea 
Prior rejection 
Late pay 
Dependent Variables 
All Consumers 
0.12 
0.09 
0.22 
0.24 
0.64 
$25.33 
1,388.30 
0.50 
0.37 
0.23 
$6.11 
379.66 
0.46 
0.16 
0.35 
0.45 
0.24 
not in equation 
not in equation 
Mean Value 
Consumers with Debt > 0 
0.12 
0.09 
0.22 
0.09 
0.65 
$28.30 
1,419.60 
0.67 
0.51 
0.33 
$3.81 
103.91 
0.46 
0.16 
0.37 
0.52 
0.16 
0.14 
0.21 
Proportion of households in sample using consumer debt = .51 
Mean ratio of outstanding debt to income for households with debt> 0 = 16.98 percent. 
Number of observations 3,271 1,657 
The estimates of the effects of rate ceilings and tax policy on the use of consumer credit 
were obtained through the estimation of a sample selection model. Two equations are 
estimated-the first predicts the probability that a household used consumer credit at the 
time the data were collected. The second equation predicts the level of credit relative to 
income (debt burden) for that subjset of the sample that had consumer credit. 
2.2. The method of analysis 
At any point in time, a large percentage of households may have no consumer credit 
outstanding although most households use some credit during their life cycle. Further, some 
households may not have credit or have as much as would be optimal because of the effects 
of legal restrictions on the availability of credit. Thus, in estimating the determinants of 
household use of consumer credit, the problem of truncated data, or sample selection bias, 
must be addressed. The procedure employed in this analysis involves the use of a sample 
selection procedure similar to that presented by Heckman (1976). 
For each household, the variable z is defined as the difference between the price that the 
household is willing to pay for consumer credit and the market price of credit. 
Socioeconomic, financial, and attitudinal factors affect the price a household is willing to 
pay, while the market price offered by creditors is a function of local credit market 
conditions, regulations, and the default risk in the lenders' portfolio of credit contracts. That 
IS, 
(1) 
where X1 ~ 1 is the matrix of variables and parameters determining these prices and u1 is the 
random component-attributes of the credit market or household which are not observed 
or cannot be measured. 
The sample selection procedure employed in this analysis first estimates the factors that 
determine z.3 Because the data are observed as a binary variable d, where d = 1 if z ~ 0, and 
0 otherwise, a probit model is specified and the probability that the household uses consumer 
credit is predicted. The maximum likelihood estimates of ~ 1 are given in table 3. 
The amount of consumer credit observed in a household's financial portfolio is a function 
of its demand for credit as well as the supply of credit. The household's debt burden, 
measured as the amount of consumer credit outstanding relative to annual pre-tax income, 
is expressed as a linear function of these supply and demand factors. That is, 
(2) 
where X2~2 is the matrix of variables and parameters determining y, and u2 denotes the 
random component. But, y is observed only if z ~ 0. Thus the regression function of equation 
(2) may be written as, 
E(y I X 2, sample selection rule) = E(y I X 2, z ~ 0). (3) 
Table 3. Probability of consumer debt use profit estimates. 
Independent Variable 
Life cycle stage 
Young single 
Single parent 
Older/working 
Older/retired 
Home Ownership 
Income-related measures 
Income (000) 
Income squared (000,000) 
Stable income 
Two-income 
Tax incentive 
Liquid assets (000) 
Liquid assets squared (000,000) 
Geographic market conditions 
Rate ceiling 
Region of residence 
West 
South 
Attitude toward credit 
Good idea 
Bad idea 
Constant 
Notes: N = 3,271. 
Log-Likelihood = -1837.3. 
Estimated Coefficient 
-0.31 * 
-0.25* 
-0.41* 
-0.90* 
0.002 
0.004* 
-0.000001 
0.39* 
0.22* 
0.31 * 
-0.026* 
0.00006* 
0.04 
0.13* 
0.12* 
0.11 * 
-0.39* 
0.006 
Restricted Log-Likelihood (J32 = 0) = -2267.0. 
Chi-squared = 859.33. 
*Significant at the 95 percent level of confidence (one-tailed test). 
t-Statistic 
-3.37 
-2.55 
-5.77 
-10.92 
0.40 
2.03 
-0.11 
6.78 
3.22 
4.12 
-7.92 
5.12 
0.83 
1.85 
2.18 
1.90 
-5.94 
0.07 
The sample selection procedure accounts for the inter-equation correlation. That is, it 
estimates equation (2) given information on the determinants of z--captured by the 
parameter, lambda. This procedure selects those observations where d = 1 and estimates 
equation (2) for that selected sample. Ordinary least squares estimates of f3 2 are presented 
in table 5. 
2.3. The results 
2.3.1. Probability of credit use. In the sample data analyzed, 51 percent of respondents 
used some consumer installment credit at the time of the survey.4 The results of the analysis, 
shown in figure 1, do not support the hypothesis that the probability of consumer credit use 
in general is a significant function of rate restrictions. The probability of credit use was not 
Table 4. Mean probability of having unsecured debt from a financial 
institution (as a percent of all debtors). 
Income Quantile 
Rate Ceiling Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest 
None or> 18% 38.9 36.6 50.7 57.0 64.7 
18% or less 25.0 37.3 35.3 44.2 60.0 
t-statistic 2.27* 0.14 3.12* 2.75* 1.05 
*Significantly less at the 95 percent level of confidence. 
significantly lower in states with low rate ceilings relative to states that were not similarly 
restricted in 1982, holding other things constant. This result is consistent with those of 
Peterson-that households wanting credit for consumption purposes are able to get it, even 
in states with severely restrictive rate ceilings. 
In contrast, an analysis of the probability that credit users had unsecured credit from 
financial institutions supported the hypothesis that the rate ceilings limited the availability 
of that type of credit (table 4).5 Only 42 percent of households with consumer credit in the 
low-rate states had any unsecured credit from financial institutions. In contrast, more than 
52 percent of borrowers in the unrestricted states had such credit. The percentages were 
significantly different at the 95 percent confidence level. Further, the analysis indicates that 
the general availability of unsecured credit from financial institutions was restricted-it was 
not simply restricted for high-risk (low-income) borrowers. The probability of having 
unsecured credit from financial institutions was significantly lower in the restricted states 
for three of five income quintiles analyzed. 
The tax incentive variable had a positive and significant coefficient. That is, those 
households with a mortgage that were in marginal federal income tax brackets of 25 percent 
or more were significantly more likely to use consumer credit relative to other households 
in the sample, holding income, creditworthiness, life cycle, and attitudinal variables 
constant. 
The coefficients of the demographic and economic variables supported our hypotheses 
regarding lenders' pricing decisions and households' demand for credit. The probability of 
credit use was significantly associated with life cycle, just as was found in earlier studies. 
Every life cycle group was significantly less likely to use consumer credit than the omitted 
group--young married couples with or without children. Consistent \Vith the hypothesis that 
lenders judge creditworthiness on the basis of the characteristics of future earnings streams, 
the level of household income was positively associated with the probability of credit use. 
Two measures of income stability-the stable income and the two-income household 
variables-were also positively and significantly associated with the probability of credit 
use. This result supports the hypothesis that credit applicants with more stable income are 
perceived as less risky by creditors and are therefore more likely to qualify for credit or are 
able to get credit at a lower cost, holding other things constant. The coefficient of the 
homeownership variable was not significant although homeownership could be interpreted 
as an indicator of income stability and credit worthiness. The homeownership variable may 
not have been significant, although it had the expected positive sign, because the length of 
time in the home rather than the fact of homeownership itself might be a more robust 
indicator of income stability. 
We hypothesized that, holding creditworthiness constant, households with sufficient 
liquid asset balances or with a negative view toward the use of credit would be less likely 
to use consumer credit. The results support these hypotheses-the probability of credit use 
was a significant negative function of the level of liquid asset holdings. However, the 
relationship is not linear. At high levels of liquid assets, the probability of credit use 
increased. This result may be unique to the time period in which the data were collected. 
Prior to the survey, interest rates for short-term, low-risk financial assets were very high 
while rates for some credit products were artificially low, due to rate ceilings or special 
financing arrangements offered by auto manufacturers. So individuals may have found it 
economically rewarding to simultaneously hold large liquid assets balances and borrow to 
fund current consumptions. Credit use varied logically with borrowers' attitudes toward the 
use of credit-those who had a negative view were significantly less likely to use it. 
The probability of credit use was significantly higher in the Western and Southern regions 
of the country relative to other geographic regions. These results are consistent with 
differences in supply conditions from region to region. Differences in the level of interest 
rates from one region to another could produce differences in the probability of credit use, 
holding other things constant. We did not have actual data on interest rates charged in 
different geographic areas included in the survey. But, several empirical studies of the level 
of interest rates for consumer loans have documented that those rates have been generally 
higher in the West and South. For example, Shay (1963) found that finance rates in the 
Western and Southern regions were higher than those in the Midwest and Northeast. 
Stafford and Dunkelberg (1969) reported that the Northeast had the lowest regional auto 
loan rates while the South had the highest rates. Peterson and Ginsberg (1981) found that 
the Western and Southern regions had the highest regional auto loan rates from commercial 
banks. 
2.3.2. Amount of credit used. While the probability of credit use in general was not 
significantly influenced by rate restrictions, the amount of consumer installment credit used 
relative to household income was significantly lower in states with low rate ceilings relative 
to states without such restrictions, holding other things constant (table 5). In a separate 
analysis of the amount of unsecured cash credit relative to income, the rate ceiling variable 
was not significant. In other words, in states with restrictive rate ceilings for unsecured cash 
credit from financial institutions, borrowers in general were less likely to have that type of 
credit (table 4). But those who were able to qualify for such credit had as much of it relative 
to income as their counterparts in less restrictive environments. The restrictions on interest 
rates reduced the probability that a household obtained unsecured cash credit and 
consequently produced a significant reduction in the average total consumer debt burdens 
of households in restricted markets-in the short run. But Peterson's (1983) results suggest 
that in the long run, those households would shift to retail credit, thus circumventing the 
effect of the rate ceilings on the amount of consumer credit used. 
Table 5. Ratio of consumer debt outstanding to annual income odinary least 
squares estimates (sample selection model). 
Independent Variable 
Life cycle stage 
Young single 
Single parent 
Older/working 
Older/retired 
Home ownership 
Income-related measures 
Income (000) 
Income squared (000,000) 
Stable income 
Two-income 
Tax incentive 
Liquid assets (000) 
Liquid assets squared (000,000) 
Geographic market conditions 
Rate ceiling 
Region of residence 
West 
South 
Attitude toward credit 
Good idea 
Bad idea 
Prior rejection 
Late pay 
Constant 
Lambda 
Inter-equation correlation 
Notes: N = 1,657. 
R2 (adjusted) = 0.03. 
Estimated Coefficient 
3.10 
1.70 
2.41 
-0.31 
3.10* 
-0.30* 
0.0009* 
-1.68 
2.04 
2.04 
0.02 
-0.0005 
-2.57* 
-0.14 
3.34* 
1.63 
0.82 
-2.33 
2.70* 
20.50 
-1.85 
0.09 
*Significant at the 95 percent level of confidence (one-tailed test). 
t-Statistic 
1.08 
0.64 
0.79 
-0.04 
2.26 
-4.86 
4.33 
-0.52 
0.94 
0.81 
0.10 
-0.53 
-2.18 
-0.08 
2.33 
1.16 
0.24 
-1.45 
1.98 
1.88 
-0.14 
The coefficient of the tax incentive variable was not significant in the analysis of the 
amount of consumer debt used relative to income. While the tax deductibility of interest is 
associated with a higher probability of debt use among households itemizing deductions, 
it is not so compelling as to cause those households to become significantly more indebted 
for consumption purposes, holding other things constant. 
The coefficients of the demographic and economic variables were reasonable. The 
amount of credit used relative to income did not differ significantly across life cycle groups. 
While the probability of credit use was expected to vary significantly across life cycle 
groups, the amount of credit used relative to income was not, holding income and other 
demographic characteristics of the household constant. Homeowners had significantly more 
credit relative to income than nonhomeowners. Those credit users who reported that they 
had had trouble making debt payments on time had significantly higher debt burdens, 
holding other things constant. However, those who had previously been rejected did not 
have significantly lower debt burdens relative to those who had not had that experience. 
The results of this estimation procedure indicate that there was little sample selection bias 
present in the modelling of the consumer debt-use decision. The coefficients estimated with 
ordinary least squares, with the sample selection process unaccounted for, differed little 
from the estimates reported here. This is evident in the insignificance of the estimated 
parameter, lambda, and a low inter-equation correlation computed in the sample selection 
model (table 5). 
3. Conclusions and implications 
Public policies affecting the cost of consumer credit and its availability and thus consumers' 
incentive and willingness to use credit for consumption purposes have undergone significant 
changes in the last decade. This analysis of the determinants of whether and how much 
households use consumer credit suggest that the relaxation of interest rate restrictions will 
not be associated with an increase in the probability of consumer credit use in the population. 
Households that wanted credit in regulated markets were able to at least partially satisfy their 
needs. The effect of rate ceilings limiting the rate of charge for unsecured credit offered by 
financial institutions was to reduce the probability of use of that type of credit. Those credit 
users who were able to qualify for unsecured cash credit from financial institutions did not 
have less of that type of credit than their counterparts in less restricted credit markets. But 
the ratio of total consumer installment debt to income was significantly lower for households 
residing in states with low rate ceilings relative to those in states without such restrictions, 
holding other things constant. 
The evidence suggests that the long-term manifestation of the deregulation of consumer 
credit markets would be an increase in the overall ratio of consumer debt to income and 
an increase in the probability of use of unsecured credit from financial institutions. Since 
the deregulation of credit markets in 1982, the ratio of consumer credit relative to disposable 
income has increased. Many factors have been suggested to account for the increase 
(Luckett and August, 1985), but our results indicate that deregulation was an important one. 
Further, one of the fastest growing segments of the consumer credit market since 1982 has 
been that for unsecured revolving credit from financial institutions. Just as it follows from 
Peterson's results that rate regulations expanded the role for merchandisers of goods and 
services in the consumer credit market, we expect the removal of those artificial barriers 
to decrease the importance of merchandisers in the credit origination process, holding other 
things constant. 
The removal of the deductibility of consumer interest will likely be associated, in the long 
term, with changes in the demographic profile of consumer credit users as well as the credit 
origination process. Households that were in the best position to take advantage of the tax 
deductibility of consumer interest, i.e., upper income households with a mortgage, were 
more likely to use consumer credit, holding other things constant, but they did not use 
significantly more of it relative to their income. The implication is that the overall risk of 
consumer credit portfolios in the past may have been reduced by the effect of tax policy. 
Holding its effect on the level of interest rates constant, the change in tax policy will likely 
be associated with a significant reduction in the probability of consumer credit use among 
upper income households and an increase in the risk of portfolios of consumer credit 
contracts. 
Evidence on the demographic characteristics of borrowers who have switched from 
consumer credit to home equity secured lines of credit since the passage of TRA indicates 
that those households have significantly higher income than credit-using households in 
general, and are those that were most likely to be getting a significant tax break with their 
use of consumer credit before tax reform (Cannet et al., 1988). With regard to the effect of 
tax reform on the credit origination process, just as merchandisers were able to offer credit 
in markets where interest rate ceilings were restrictive, merchandisers will also be able to 
offer "cheap credit" when consumer interest is no longer deductible. Therefore, the 
combined effect of the removal of rate ceilings and the elimination of the consumer interest 
deduction will have an indeterminate effect on the role of merchandisers in the credit 
origination process. 
Notes 
1. Interest rates charged by commercial banks for new auto loans were above 10 percent (the maximum rate 
that was allowed in Arkansas) in every year from 1971 through 1982 (Sullivan and Fain, 1984). 
2. In 1983, only 28 percent of individual household income tax returns contained itemized deductions, according 
to the Internal Revenue Service. 
3. The program LIMDEP, developed by William Greene of New York University, was employed. 
4. Consumer installment credit included all loans with regular payments which had been used to finance 
consumption goods and credit card debts outstanding for those respondents who claimed to revolve balances on 
their cards. Real-estate secured loans were not included in the definition of consumer installment credit. 
5. Unsecured credit from financial institutions included bank card credit and credit for purposes other than to 
buy an automobile or make additions or repair to the home for which the papers had been signed at the financial 
institution. 
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